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The business firm has become a central institution in contemporary 
society in ways which make it, whether the owners and managers of firms 
want this or not, a problematic institution for democratic politics, or indeed 
for any politics at all, and therefore for the construction of any new form of 
social contract. The question has several very diverse aspects, and it is 
their cumulative effect that makes the issue so problematic. First, 
increasing weight is placed on the individual firm (rather than a whole 
industry, or government policy) to find new opportunities for economic 
progress, which has raised the firm to a position of primacy among the 
institutions of our societies. Second, large corporations are in certain 
circumstances able to exercise real power in a manner that is not provided 
for in either economic or constitutional theory. Third, firms are becoming 
important institutions of identity for their personnel, partly because the 
most advanced firms increasingly feel a need to develop a company 
culture, and partly because this growing strength of firms is happening at a 
time when, several other social institutions undergoing crises, people are 
becoming increasingly dependent on their place of work to satisfy a range 
of social needs. Fourth, firms have an increasing wider social legitimacy, 
partly through their role in funding or sponsoring aspects of social life 
outside the sphere of their market activities, and partly because their forms 
and practices are coming to be seen as almost the only acceptable ones for 
running organizations of many different kinds.
I shall briefly explain what I mean by each of these points before going on 
to consider why I think they create a political problem.
The Changing Position of the Firm in Western Society
Increased dependence on the firm for economic success
For the first few post-war decades, in most western economies there was a 
co-existence between autonomous companies (exploring and exploiting 
niches in the constantly changing and innovating product markets) and 
government policy (which, whether through demand management, 
indicative planning, provision of infrastructure, or some other devices, 
provided a macro-level framework). Although the political rhetoric of the 
political right stressed a need to reduce the role of government, while that 
of the left wanted to increase it, governments of all kinds agreed on a basic 
pattern of this kind. The diversity of approaches was surveyed by 



























































































The Social Contract and the Problem of the Firm
later contributions written when this model was already in crisis (1983, 
1984).
Since then a number of changes have occurred which have shaken these 
patterns. There has been failing confidence that demand management of a 
Keynesian kind can restrain inflation. There have also been various 
changes which have increased the uncertainty and lack of predictability of 
product markets in an economy characterized by: rapid technological 
change and innovation; intensifying global competition; the return to an 
era of steep trade cycles after the end of the Keynesian interlude; the 
increased orientation of product and service development towards volatile 
consumer markets. All this is well known. The implication that is 
important for the present argument is that the individual company comes to 
be generally perceived as the only mechanism sufficiently flexible and 
close to market to cope with product market uncertainty. While many firms 
might fail in the attempt, some will succeed and survive; and while they 
are making the attempt they plausibly demand as much freedom as 
possible from extraneous constraint.
There is therefore an extreme lack of confidence on the part of the public 
sector that it could play a constructive part in such an environment. This is 
exacerbated by the prevalence of neo-liberal ideology, but cannot be 
reduced to it as it has independent causes. In fact, one reason for the 
popularity of neo-liberalism may be that it recognized a deficiency in 
public policy of which policy-makers were already aware, and provided 
them with an alternative. The lack of confidence may not always be 
justified: such developments as Minitel and the TGV have shown that the 
state (or at least the French state), has had a capacity to innovate 
successfully in high-technology, customer-oriented sectors. However, 
within the industrial world at large today a lack of confidence in public 
capability has to be taken for granted. Governments increasingly believe 
that the only action they can take is to deregulate, to get themselves out of 
firms' way (Rose-Ackerman 1992).
Within the argument about the primacy of the firm there is considerable 
inconsistency over whether very small or very large companies better 
embody the scope that firms offer. Until very recently it appeared that new 
advantages lay with small firms, which are better able to realize the values 
of innovativeness, fast movement and flexibility (Geroski and Schwalbach 
1986; Acs and Audretsch 1990; Thurick 1995). Around the time that the 
crises within such firms as IBM and Fiat were coinciding with a rapid rise 





























































































Italia, it was widely argued in the management science literature that the 
days of corporate giants were numbered. Small firms have been seen as 
particularly important in the creation of jobs (see for example the 
affirmation of this in European Commission 1994, p. 13). But, somehow 
without disturbing this conclusion, gigantism has come back in favour. A 
few massive mergers in pharmaceuticals, mass media corporations and 
elsewhere, the achievement of giant size by Microsoft, have heralded a 
return to arguments about the absolute need for enormous size, and even 
for strategic alliances among companies which already individually have 
enormous size, if firms are to stand any chance in a globalized economy 
(Hayward 1995).
Behind these fluctuations some things remain constant. If small firms seem 
central to economic success, that is taken as a clear demonstration that 
firms must be given as much entrepreneurial freedom as possible, because 
no public body could deal properly with small, flexible units. If giant 
firms seem central to economic success, that is taken as a clear 
demonstration that firms must be given as much entrepreneurial freedom 
as possible, because no public body could deal properly with such trans­
national, trans-sectoral organizations. Or, even if public power of some 
kind ought to be exercised, it is doomed to be unsuccessful in the global 
economy of giant corporations and financial institutions (Strange 1994: ch 
2).
Large corporations and real power
There have been many periods in the past where large firms have been real 
power players on the political scene. However, (i) this did not in general 
occur within societies that had the democratic aspirations of contemporary 
advanced societies, and (ii) with a small number of exceptions (mainly in 
the UK and the Netherlands) even large firms could not escape national 
jurisdictions. The new global corporations, especially when they form 
strategic alliances, have a capacity to regulate world trade, to select among 
regimes for soft laws on such issues as labour conditions, corruption and 
taxation, in a manner and with a speed and flexibility that completely 
outpaces the slow, pluralistic and constitutionally correct practices of 
cross-national political mechanisms (for example the European Union).
Economic theory, which is accepted on this point by most constitutional 
approaches, argues that the concept of power cannot be applied to pure 
competitive market economies, since within the pure market no one actor 




























































































The Social Contract and the Problem of the Finn
are anonymous and non-strategic by the definitional criteria of the perfect 
free market. Of course, the possibility of monopolies and of collusion 
among firms appearing in practice is recognized, but laws are then framed 
to prevent these and uphold the pure competitive model. Contemporary 
markets, it is then pointed out, are very competitive indeed. Therefore, 
there is no need to worry about the power of companies; such a 
phenomenon simply cannot exist, provided we guarantee the competitive 
order.
There are two weaknesses in this argument. First, a competitive market and 
a pure market are wrongly treated as one and the same. It is possible for a 
market comprising only two firms to be ferociously competitive. However, 
such a market is not 'pure'; it cannot be claimed that the firms in a market 
with a small number of actors match the criteria whereby markets ensure 
the impossibility of power (anonymity and lack of strategic capacity). It is 
only within the pure market of economic theory (multiple actors, none of 
whom can produce an effect by acting alone) that competition takes a form 
that can be held to be a sufficient condition for removing all anxieties 
about concentrations of power within the authority structure of giant firms.
Second, the approach to monopoly within most national jurisdictions is 
naive. Although anti-monopoly regimes now usually recognize a concept 
of market power and not just an accounting measure of monopolistic 
presence, attention is still primarily concentrated on individual product 
markets, and generous scope is given to the consideration of substitute 
goods as diluting monopoly power. (For example, the market in cola 
drinks comes close to being a global duopoly, but people can drink 
lemonade or many other substitutes, so it is not as matter for concern.) 
Monopoly law and regulatory practice are very reticent in considering the 
implications of giant size that is distributed across different product 
markets and national markets, so long as a firm's presence in any one of 
these does not itself constitute a monopoly. This ignores the capacity of 
transnational corporations to marshal global and cross-sectoral resources 
strategically, outside the conditions internal to any one product market. 
Such strategic action constitutes an act of power and is not therefore 
confinable within market theory.
For example, the media giant. News International, has recently been using 
its global strength (extensive newspaper ownership in a number of 
countries, a strong presence in the heavily oligopolistic world of satellite 
television) to subsidize the price of some of its UK newspapers in order to 





























































































competitors. The competitors do not have the same global and cross- 
sectoral resources as News International and are therefore unable to follow 
its price reductions while holding constant the size and quality of their 
products. It has proved impossible to have this regarded as questionable 
behaviour within British monopoly legislation. In contrast, the privatized 
British telecommunications corporation, BT, has been prevented from 
using profits from running the main public telephone system in order to 
subsidize the consumer prices of its telephone equipment, on the grounds 
that its competitors in this latter field do not have a similar capacity. This 
has been possible because, as a privatized, formerly state-owned, 
corporation, BT is subject to special regulatory arrangements. It is the fact 
that it used to be within the public sector that enables BT to be seen as 
raising a problem of market power, not the fact of the market power per se, 
that concept being difficult to acknowledge within the purely private 
sector.
Companies as cultures and as communities
The most advanced firms increasingly feel a need to develop a company 
culture, or 'whole company' approach, if they are to succeed. This means 
shaping all their activities, and every possible element that comes within 
the scope of the firm, in targeted pursuit of competitive success. In 
particular, their employees and the personce of their employees', their 
characters and the quality of their loyalty to the organization, must be 
fashioned according to a central, co-ordinated plan. The guiding concept is 
'human resource management'.
Although present employment conditions are often dubbed post-Fordist, 
these developments constitute an extension of Fordism to parts that 
Taylorism never reached. Although the immediate origins of such practices 
today are often imitations of Japanese practices, they have an older history, 
some western firms having long developed the idea that employees should 
identify with the company and give it a commitment of time, loyalty and 
affection going far beyond the strict terms of the employment contract. 
Among German firms in particular senior managerial staff became a kind 
of private civil service or Beamtetum, in imitation of the 19th century 
German state's demand for such loyalty in exchange for the status honour 
conferred on its officials (Kocka, 1981).
A second and increasingly more vigorous source, however, derives from 
the growing relative importance of the various services sectors within the 
economy. Whereas in manufacturing firms there might be considered to be 




























































































The Social Contract and the Problem of the Firm
located) and the product (where there are few people), in services the 
process is the product, and the personality of many employees is engaged 
as much as their technical performance. It is this characteristic of domestic 
service that makes that set of occupations particularly humiliating to 
perform, with extraordinary requirements for personal deference as well as 
impersonal subordination to authority.
From the point of view of many people in western societies, the claim of 
the employer to make demands on a growing number of aspects of 
personality is a problematic intrusion on private space. Clearly, some 
people do not feel this, or IBM and many similar companies would never 
have been able to recruit a work force, but one might expect the supply of 
such persons to be relatively limited. If large numbers of employees, going 
beyond the ranks of the self-selected, are expected to act in these ways, 
and towards private corporations rather than towards the public agency of 
the state, the situation becomes rather different.
However, this tendency is contradicted by two other central trends in 
contemporary company practice:
(i) particularly within the increasingly dominant Anglo-Saxon form of 
corporate ownership, firms change their identity changes very rapidly as 
they engage in take-overs, mergers and frequent reorganizations; it is 
difficult for such shapeless structures to insist on conformity to a company 
culture;
(ii) the growing casualization of the work force (including such 
developments as temporary labour contracts, franchising and the 
imposition of self-employed status on people who are de facto employees) 
is difficult to reconcile with long-term bonding to a company culture. To 
some extent of course these two contrasting practices - human resource 
maximization and casualization - are found in different kinds of firm, or 
between different types of employee (core versus marginal) within firms.
Both these points raise an interesting question. It might be difficult for a 
firm whose own identity is subject to fluctuation and fragmentation, and/or 
whose employment strategy involves casualization, to demand deep 
personal commitments, but in a world where firms are trying to maximize 
everything, they might well try.
In this they might be helped by a further development. The growing 
strength of firms as institutions is occurring at a time when several other 
social institutions are undergoing crises, and some people are becoming 





























































































employing firm, to satisfy a range of needs going beyond work and 
income. In the majority of advanced societies growing divorce rates have 
made many families unreliable as social units; crime and the motorization 
of transport have reduced the role of neighbourhoods and urban public 
space; outside the USA, religious organizations continue to decline. It may 
therefore be hypothesized that the work place has grown in relative 
importance as a social as well as an economic resource for many people.
The legitimacy of firms in the wider society
Firms have an increasing role in funding or sponsoring aspects of social 
life outside the sphere of their market activities. This extends the role and - 
because these are non-market areas with non-market decision processes - 
the power of firms and their central decision-makers to further areas of 
society. The extended crisis of public finance in most advanced societies, 
combined with a political priority on reducing public expenditure in order 
to limit taxation, is the main cause of this change. The relative role of 
public funding for many activities has declined. Its place is increasingly 
taken by the growth of sponsorship, whether from motives of advertising, 
public beneficence, the desire for immortality, a scheme for reducing 
taxation obligations or an enjoyment of power. Nearly every non-profit or 
low-profit human activity that requires financial support now seeks 
sponsorship by companies. A share in control of the activity is only 
occasionally, though sometimes importantly, required in exchange. 
However, there is always an exercise of power in the decision to sponsor 
one activity rather than another.
This process has two interesting consequences:
(i) the decision-making power of persons who have authority within firms, 
within the market sphere, is extended to other spheres - spheres where the 
rules of professional competence and the market that contain their power 
in the firm itself do not apply. In particular, they may thereby be able to 
exercise influence over areas that had been deliberately protected from 
corporate power and market forces (such as higher education and the arts). 
In some ways firms hereby acquire a public rather than a private power. 
This can happen in many ways, but perhaps the most obvious is the 
practice, originating in the USA but rapidly spreading, of permitting 
charitable donations to be offset against liability for taxation. If one 
assumes that the tax revenues thereby foregone result in reduced public 
expenditure, what has happened is that wealthy corporations (and 




























































































The Social Contract and the Problem of the Firm
activities to favour with their own money, but simultaneously to pre-empt 
public money for the same activities, removing decision-making power 
from public agencies.
(ii) Through their growing prominence in sponsorship activities companies 
come to be seen as the most significant and legitimate institutions within 
society, which makes it more difficult to articulate criticisms of their 
behaviour. A further consequence of this is that senior managerial 
personnel are in this way acquiring some of the attributes of a ruling class 
(see Crouch 1993).
Of course, it can be argued that public funding for cultural and intellectual 
activities can be at least as dangerous as funding by rich corporations; at 
least some corporations to the lists of sponsors introduces some pluralism, 
even if it is the pluralism of a very narrow segment of society. Many 
examples can be provided to demonstrate the force of this point, 
particularly with respect to the behaviour of state-owned television 
channels in several countries. However, as I shall discuss in more detail 
below, states and citizens in many democratic societies had developed 
codes and understandings about the permissible limits of government 
interference. Such codes have often not developed around privately funded 
activities.
On a different point, because firms are increasingly the central institutions 
of our societies, their forms and practices are coming to be seen as almost 
the only acceptable ones for running organizations of many different kinds. 
Non-firm organizations are losing confidence in their sui generis status 
and believe that they must model themselves on firms, even if this means 
changing the character of their activities. The argument has been applied in 
particular to government departments and public services. (Osborne and 
Gaebler's Reinventing Government (1992) is in many respects the key text 
for this, though it is often forgotten that, as their title implies, the authors 
were trying to find new, innovative ways in which government could learn 
from business in order better to carry out its tasks; they were not 
advocating the privatization or diminution of government.) There may 
often be efficiency gains from this process, as firms in the market place 
clearly have better records at caring about the efficient application of 
means to ends than, say, churches, state bureaucracies or families.






























































































(i) Often, though not always, the reason why an activity has not been 
treated in this way in the past has been that it has been inappropriate or 
distorting to do so. Some of the controversies resulting from the imposition 
of internal markets in health services have this character; many of the 
transactions involved between teams of health workers are diffuse 
exchanges governed by an ethic of professional duty and extreme 
concentration on the goal of patient care (Altenstetter and Haywood 1991). 
It is not just high transaction costs which are involved in trying to replace 
that dense network of co-operation by transparent, quantifiable accounting 
rules. To counter the danger of distortions from such a process, in some 
cases public policy prevents the complete acceptance of a corporate logic; 
however, if it still insists on similar overall outcomes it might simply shift 
the distortion to a different point. For example, a supermarket chain can 
improve productivity by closing smaller outlets and building a small 
number of very large outlets on out-of-town sites. (The loss of trade from 
previous customers who do not have private cars and cannot reach the new 
outlet is probably cost-effective, because these will usually have been poor 
people of low spending power.) Now read those sentences again, replacing 
'supermarket chain' by 'local education authority', 'outlet' by 'school' and 
'customers' by 'pupils' and one can see why school authorities are not as 
cost-effective as supermarket chains. However, today education authorities 
may well be required to achieve the kind of productivity gains found in 
supermarket chains, while not being able to use that particular strategy.
(ii) If firms are the only sui generis institutions, then the only valid 
expertise is that which derives from experience in managing them. Not 
only does this mean that managers from commercial firms are likely to be 
placed in authority over many other fields of action, but persons with 
commercial experience will monopolize advice on public policy. This 
further extends the power of persons from the firm sector to other sectors 
of life as discussed above, helping to turn them into a new form of ruling 
class. Also, of course, it places them in a strong position to protect their 
own private interests.
To date the apogee of this process of subordinating other institutions to 
the logic of corporate structure has been Forza Italia, the first political 
party to be in effect a branch of a corporate giant, with employees taking 
the place of members - and, for good measure, using the television stations 




























































































The Social Contract and the Problem of the Firm
Why these Developments Pose Problems for a New Social Contract ?
Within societies that place considerable and perhaps increasing weight on 
the containment and scrutiny of public political power, the tolerance of the 
several extensions of the power of firms (in reality, of a limited number of 
individuals in key positions in firms) leads to considerable imbalance, 
since these extensions are largely unregulated, unnoticed and 
unscrutinized. This imbalance makes it difficult to envisage the corporate 
sector being brought to the table to agree to a social contract, unless it was 
very much on its terms in a way that undermined the existing rights of 
customers, the general public and, particularly, employees.
The imbalance takes primarily two forms. First, firms are able to elude 
public action because of the greater agility afforded to them by the lack of 
scrutiny and constraint. (Good examples of this would be seen from a 
comparison of how the EU sets about introducing a regulation and how a 
strategic alliance of global corporations reaches agreements on its 
procedures - which is also a regulatory process.) Second, as we have seen, 
in a number of different ways dominant individuals from firms 
increasingly exercise influence and sometimes control over many public 
and non-firm domains. In this activity too they are not subject to the same 
procedural rules as public or political actors, even if the scope of their 
action may sometimes rival these.
Furthermore, at the very moment when the power and scope of the 
corporate sector is growing, it is in several respects becoming less 
constrained and less accountable in how it uses that power than in the 
recent past. Globalization makes possible a certain amount of 'regime 
shopping', which has in turn led to a wave of deregulation as national 
governments seek to lower the cost of accepting their jurisdiction and act 
in fear that any constraints on firms may burden them in international 
competition. The slack labour markets of the fourth quarter of this century 
(compared with the third) makes possible increasing evasion of obligations 
to employees.
These tendencies are partly contradicted by a number of developments. In 
the USA the eagerness of citizens to take legal action against any company 
(or individual or government department) that deceives them or injures 
their interests in any way, and the willingness of the courts to respond 
favourably to these actions, makes firms very cautious and wary about any 
damage they might cause - at least to sections of the public rich enough to 





























































































corporate good behaviour going beyond what is required by statute law. 
Europeans and European legal systems have yet to learn to act way. 
Further, the growth of ecological concerns almost everywhere in the 
advanced world has required the imposition of new constraints on 
enterprises, and some pressure towards 'stakeholder capitalism' - which 
means essentially the more or less formal recognition of the rights within a 
company of interests other than shareholders: employees, customers, 
persons in the environment affected by a firm's operations.
There is however an important imbalance here. While it is probably true 
that the protection of customers and the wider environment against the 
actions of private corporations has gained considerably in importance in 
recent years, the protection of those most vulnerable to the actions of 
corporate management - employees - has stood still or in some cases may 
even have declined in the search for labour market 'flexibility'. It is 
certainly the case that these rights are under considerable political pressure 
on the grounds that they have become associated with high unemployment: 
once macro-economic measures for tackling unemployment have been 
virtually ruled out, there is virtually total reliance on company 
managements for creating jobs. If the price they demand is a reduction in 
labour standards, there will be strong pressure to accede. In this way the 
reduction of unemployment has become a rallying call of the political right 
in several countries, reversing the previous historical pattern. In the 
western country where the attack on labour rights has proceeded furthest 
(the United Kingdom), the position has been reached that an employee 
stands a good chance of sustaining a right against an employer only if it 
can be interpreted as a right of an investor, a member of an ethnic 
minority, or a woman (For a discussion of how pension rights in particular 
have a sound basis only because they can be seen as investor rights, see 
Davies and Freedland 1995: 575; see the same authors (pp 381-5 and 583- 
5 for an analysis of how the strength of ethnic minority and gender rights 
in the UK have moved in the opposite direction to employee rights.)
This raises the fundamental problem posed by the neo-liberal state: the 
sole macro-economic policy remaining to a state that has accepted the 
logic of the priority of the company as set out at the beginning of this 
article is to de-regulate the corporate environment as much as possible 
(Crouch and Streeck 1996). Universal deregulation is in fact the functional 
equivalent for the 1990s of Keynesianism or planification during the 
1950s and 1960s. It is background, macro-level action by the state in 
support of corporate entrepreneurial activity. The problem with it is that it 



























































































The Social Contract and the Problem of the Firm
it killed him too. One everything has been deregulated, the state no longer 
has even a potentiality for a capacity to act. The economic fate of the 
population rests solely with the firms, domestic and transnational, which 
operate within its boundaries. There can be no assurances that the invisible 
hand which may enable such an economy to achieve a high level of 
efficiency will do so in a way which can provide a reasonable and stable 
standard of living for all persons living within the society. The aspiration 
for such a standard will however remain.
What is to be Done?
It is relatively easy to spell out the kinds of measure that could equip firms 
with a constitutional and legal framework required by their social 
predominance and consistent with the concept of a renewed and balanced 
social contract - which is different from and larger than what is required to 
enable them to act as the orderly economic actors that they are in most 
advanced societies.
First, in recognition of the growing dependence of employees on firms, 
employees' rights as individuals and as groups need to be protected and 
advanced in such areas as: protection from unfair dismissal, openness and 
access to information, consultation and codetermination (e.g. works 
councils), the effective right to representation by autonomous 
organizations (i.e. trade unions). (Trade unions in a world in which 
individual companies are dominant and many employees engaged in 
relations of commitment and loyalty to firms' goals need to be rather 
different from most existing unions - but that is a different question.) 
Second, the concept of 'stakeholder capitalism', already more easily 
realized within certain northern European jurisdictions than within Anglo- 
American company law or southern European practice, has recently 
become a useful focus of debate, especially in the UK. This could prove a 
fruitful means of expressing employee, customer and ecological interests. 
Third, company law needs to take a broader, less purely economic, market- 
bound view of the concept of corporate power. Experience emerging from 
the regulation of, privatized corporations may well be usefully applied 
more generally. Further, however, this is not just a matter of regulatory 
control, but in fact also of policy to guarantee the strength and viability of 
the competitive order itself, in the full sense envisaged by the original 
sozialer Markt . That is, it requires a broad range of positive measures for 






























































































Fourth, funding and sponsorship of non-market or weak-market activities 
need to be placed on a more constitutional basis. In the debates of the mid- 
1980s that led to the rise of private, and decline of public, sponsorship of 
cultural, sporting and educational activities a caricature was presented of a 
dangerously monolithic and political state against a vibrant pluralism of 
benevolent private donors. In reality, in many countries the state had found 
creative and successful ways of establishing barrier institutions, relatively 
impervious to political pressure and more or less pluralistic, for 
channelling public funds; whereas the world of private, and especially 
corporate, donors contains much dubious practice and power-mongering. 
In part, a restoration of the concept of the public sector, mediated through 
barrier institutions, requires revival and re-energizing before matters have 
slipped beyond recall. In addition, however, much can be done to reduce 
the pre-emption of control by the corporate sector. Taxation regimes which 
grant exemptions for charitable giving, or even which accept sponsorship 
as allowable business expenditure, need to privilege types of corporate 
sponsorship and donations that accept constitutional forms. By this I mean 
forms modelled on the autonomous, self-governing foundation or trust 
pattern of the Ford Foundation, the Volkswagen Stiftung, etc., rather than 
the cruder forms of direct funding that have grown at such an 
extraordinary pace in very recent years.
Finally, areas of human activity outside the scope of firms and markets - 
education, culture, health, religion - need to recover self-confidence, self­
assertiveness, own definitions of efficiency and procedures for achieving 
it, and belief in their characteristics sui generis .
While one could extend such a list of requirements in a number of other 
respects, and usefully debate their practicality, one must stop short in order 
to end with a final reassertion of the difficulty at the present time of most 
such ideas. Attempts to implement any elements of such a programme 
encounter two fundamental obstacles. These are;
1. Europe is currently experiencing simultaneously a globalization of 
economic processes but a reassertion of the nation state (against 
supranational political entities) at the political level. There is therefore a 
growing divorce between the level at which political action needs to be 
taken and that at which it can be taken. There is an important exception to 
the decline of supranationalism: policy to deregulate markets. But this is 
the exception that proves the rule, being an extension of the point made 
above with reference to purely national polities. The deregulatory part of 




























































































The Social Contract and the Problem of the Firm
Market, has met with universal applause, no government being more 
supportive than the neo-liberal British one which in all other respects is 
fully opposed to further integration. This is because deregulation is a form 
of integration that immobilizes the scope for further political action.
2. At a time of economic uncertainty and fears of the implications of 
growing competition, there is extreme reluctance to impose constraints on 
the interpretation of the needs of firms offered by the corporate sector 
itself, especially given the new prominence that that sector has acquired in 
policy-making as discussed above. While discussion of stakeholder 
capitalism flourishes, firms within, for example, German company law, are 
eagerly looking for ways of becoming more like Anglo-American 
companies, with the flexibility and unencumbered manoeuvrability 
afforded by having shareholders as the sole legitimate stakeholders. 
Paradoxically, it is at times of relatively easy prosperity, when business is 
perhaps most inclined to relax and behave itself, that other social actors are 
inclined to take its success for granted and therefore to impose rules of 
behaviour on it. When times are tough, and firms most likely to explore 
every avenue, every kind of behaviour, to achieve success, everyone else is 
afraid to question them.
In particular it is very difficult at the present time to argue in favour of 
strengthening employees' rights at work. In the absence of any confidence 
in macro-economic measures, the problems of unemployment in European 
economies are increasingly seen as amenable to solution only by 
weakening the rights of employees and strengthening those of managers, 
so that it is easier and cheaper to deploy and dispose of workers as 
management chooses (see, for example, the central burden of the argument 
of the OECD's Jobs Study (OECD 1994).
There are exceptions and counter-trends; in a complex world there always 
will be. The EU's policy on works councils has made extraordinary 
progress, defying several of the expectations of the above arguments; the 
sheer scale of the ecological dangers that we are producing often induces 
greater public fear than do firms' threats that attempts to regulate them on 
these grounds will make them move elsewhere. South Korea and some 
other newly industrialized countries are showing how, after a period of 
unrestrained corporate dominance, publics do begin to assert other 
priorities. In general however, for as long as conditions 1. and 2. obtain, 
and in particular for as long as it is difficult for public agencies to produce 
strategies for productive job creation and economic advance that do not 





























































































position in our society that the firm has acquired will remain a major 
constraint on any attempts to renegotiate the social contract - unless of 
course it is to be one on a kind of East Asian model of a company- 
dominated culture in which mass citizenship rights in the wider society 
were much diminished from the current expectations of most western 
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